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1. Introduction
Over the years, the specification of mainstream aggregate consumption functions has be-
come increasingly more sophisticated. From a humble beginning as a simple relationship
between current consumption and current income, additional independent variables have
been added (e.g. income uncertainty, the relative price of nondurables, unemployment
rate, inflation rate) and wealth has joined income as a principal explanatory variable.
Even the wealth measure has become more comprehensive over time, starting with liq-
uid assets and subsequently being extended to include durables, financial and housing
assets. However, one key component of wealth has not been adequately assessed in main-
stream aggregate consumption functions and that is pension wealth. Yet pension wealth
is enormous, accounting for 50% of all personal wealth in the UK, for example.
However a different literature, originating with [31]Feldstein (1974), has used the ag-
gregate consumption function with various types of pension wealth to test, amongst other
things, various hypotheses in public finance, such as whether Ricardian equivalence holds.
At the same time, there have been criticisms both of the measures of pension wealth
and of the underlying model (namely the extended life cycle model) used to test these
hypotheses.
This paper brings together a number of different strands from the above literatures.
Its principal aim is to examine the impact on consumption and retirement behaviour of
various components of wealth, especially pension wealth. It does so within the context
of a well-specified econometric model that is developed from a specific economic model
underlying optimising consumption behaviour.1 Finally, it uses superior measures of
the wealth variables than have hitherto been used. For example, all the pension wealth
estimates are based on appropriate actuarial methods as explained in [11]Blake and Orszag
(1999).
The resulting model should be seen in the light of [47]Hendry’s (1994) comments:
‘[T]he explanation of predictive failure in the consumption function [in the late 1980s]
lies in the behaviour of excluded factors rather than changes in included factors that were
inappropriately modelled. Thus the focus [in his paper] shifts to interactions with financial
deregulation and uncertainty ... The impact of such additional variables as unemployment
and interest rates was tested without any positive evidence resulting, but demographic
change, illiquid wealth and house prices were not tested for relevance, although they could
all potentially matter. Thus a great deal remains to be learnt about the behaviour of this
much studied aggregate.’ (p.87)
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the impact
of pension wealth on consumption, savings and induced retirement. Section 3 presents a
model of consumption and retirement behaviour, while the estimated models are discussed
in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1A more eclectic model is used for retirement behaviour.
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2. Review of the Literature on the Impact of Pension Wealth on
Consumption, Savings and Induced Retirement
The earliest time series studies of the effect of (state) pension wealth on consumption and
savings behaviour were those of [31][32][34][36] Feldstein (1974,1976,1979,
1982). He used the life cycle model with induced retirement to identify a savings re-
placement (or wealth substitution) effect and a retirement effect. With the first effect,
state pensions reduce the need to save privately for retirement. With the second effect,
state pensions induce workers to retire earlier than they otherwise would and this in-
creases the need to save privately for retirement in order to maintain living standards.
The net effect of these two opposing influences is an empirical matter and Feldstein’s own
time series estimates on US data over the period 1930-74 (even when corrected for the
computer programming error identified by [60]Leimer and Lesnoy (1982)) indicated that
social security wealth had a small but statistically significant effect in reducing private sav-
ings (increasing consumption). He found similar results in other countries ([35]Feldstein
(1980)).
Feldstein’s work generated a substantial debate. One strand was theoretical and
revolved around the appropriate model to test the underlying hypothesis. [4][5]Barro
(1974,1978), for example, argued that Feldstein’s model ignored private intergenerational
transfers (such as bequests to children from parents concerned about the burden of their
own retirement benefits). The effect of these would be to offset exactly the impact of
mandatory social security payments, so that Ricardian equivalence holds. Barro, using a
consumption function similar to Feldstein’s but with additional variables (the government
surplus, the unemployment rate and the stock of durable goods), found using US data
that the effect of social security wealth on consumption was statistically insignificant2.
Another strand of the debate initiated by Feldstein concerned the measures that were
used to proxy pension wealth. His social security wealth measure was a rather crude
approximation to the underlying true variable which is the actuarial value of the social
security pension that individuals expect to receive in retirement. Feldstein made the
following simplifying assumptions: the ratio of benefits to disposable income remains
constant over time at the historical average of 0.41; the number of future beneficiaries
equals the number of current covered workers adjusted for differences in labour force
participation by age; and the number of females receiving widow’s benefits in future is
proportional to the number of current male covered workers and pensioners3.
2Early UK time series studies also found that there was no statistically significant effect on savings
of pension wealth whether the pension wealth measure was state pension wealth alone, occupational
pension wealth alone, or state and private pension wealth combined ([49]Hemming (1978), [50]Hemming
and Harvey (1983) and [17]Browning (1982)).
3UK studies also made some unsatisfactory assumptions concerning pension wealth. [49]Hemming
(1978) made an early attempt to use appropriate actuarial methods (discounting future anticipated cash
flows weighted by survival probabilities), but his series was too short to draw meaningful conclusions
and, subsequently, official estimates were revised downwards. [50]Hemming and Harvey (1983) made the
following assumptions: pension wealth is a scalar multiple of current pension benefits; financial wealth
is equal to the present value of an annuity determined by the current level of pre-tax interest income
discounted by 10% with no allowance for real earnings growth; housing wealth is inferred from rateable
values; and the possibility of being an early leaver and so getting less than the maximum pension of two
thirds of final salary is ignored. [17]Browning (1982) made the following assumptions: real state pensions
grow at a constant rate (less than the discount rate), even though real state pensions are constant over
time, although the numbers claiming them grow over time; a rectangular age distribution over the ages
0 to 72; private pension wealth equals the market value of pension funds (so that the surplus is assumed
always to be zero); unfunded schemes equal the size of funded schemes, so that private pension wealth is
assumed to equal twice the market value of pension funds.
The Impact of Wealth on Consumption and Retirement Behaviour in the UK 3
Other investigators have found evidence inconsistent with the life cycle model’s predic-
tions that wealth built up during the working life is run down during retirement. [26]Darby
(1979), [57]Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), and [59]Laitner and Juster (1996) found that
‘life cycle assets’ in the US (arising from accumulated savings) accounted for at most 30%
of total US assets (the remainder having been inherited). [69]Mirer (1979), [25]Danziger
et al. (1983) and [52]Horioka et al. (1996) found that the elderly in the US and Japan
do not decumulate wealth sufficiently rapidly (indeed they appear to accumulate wealth
in the US) to be consistent with the life cycle model (under certainty with no bequest
motive). [40]Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) found that the demand for annuities in
retirement in the US was too low if the life cycle model with life-time uncertainty was
valid. This may be because annuity yields are actuarially unfair (for both adverse se-
lection and moral hazard reasons), so that precautionary savings are higher than would
otherwise be the case in the presence of uncertain lifetimes. Involuntary bequests would
be an unintended consequence of this4.
Further evidence is available from cross-section studies. Most of these found that social
security wealth tends to reduce savings, while private pension wealth tends to increase
savings. [56]Kotlikoff (1979) and [61]Leimer and Richardson (1992), using US data, found
that social security wealth replaced between 0.6 and 0.67 of private wealth (rather than
the 1 if the life cycle model was valid). [81]Takayama (1990) found that social security
wealth reduces the savings ratio in Japan by 12%5. [44]Green (1981), using UK data,
found that occupational pension savings increased discretionary non-pension savings with
coefficients in the range 0.48-1.19 (rather than -1 if there was perfect substitution).
Cross-section studies have also been used to determine the effect of pension schemes
on inducing retirement. [28]Disney, Meghir and Whitehouse (1994) and [64]Meghir and
Whitehouse (1997), in studies using UK data, found that workers with occupational pen-
sion rights tended to remain longer in particular jobs, but also tended to retire earlier
than those without them; also the earlier the age at which workers began to accrue these
rights, the more likely they were to take early retirement. The income and wealth effects
of occupational pension assets therefore appear to dominate the intertemporal substitu-
tion effect which would tend to delay retirement since greater work leads to a higher final
salary pension. For workers without occupational pension rights, the most likely causes of
permanent job exit prior to normal retirement age are redundancy and ill-health. There
are also offsetting effects present with unfunded state pension schemes, but they are rather
different from those operating with funded private pension schemes. On the one hand,
[77]Sheshinski (1978), [15]Boskin (1977) and [16]Boskin and Hurd (1978) argue that if
higher social security taxes are needed to pay the state pensions of the growing elderly
population, this provides a disincentive effect that could lead to a reduction in labour
force participation and earlier retirement. On the other hand, [13]Blinder, Gordon and
Wise (1980) argue that state pensions do not necessarily have the effect of encouraging
4Similar inconsistencies with the life cycle model have been found using flow rather than stock data:
[82]Taylor (1971), for example, found that for the US the responsiveness of discretionary savings to a rise in
social security contributions was -2.16, when it should be -1 if Ricardian equivalence held; [83]Threadgold
(1978), using UK data, found that private pension savings tended to increase total savings; [75]Pitelis
(1985), also using UK data, found that the responsiveness of discretionary non-pension savings to a rise
in private pension savings varied between 0.8 and 1.25, whereas it should be -1 if there was perfect
substitution between them.
5However, some studies found no significant relationship between consumption and social security
wealth, e.g. [13]Blinder, Gordon and Wise (1983), [58]Kurz (1984) and [27]David and Menchik (1985),
both using US data.
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earlier retirement, since delayed retirement after state pension age can result in a more
than actuarially fair increase in the state pension. The effects differ with different social
security systems, of course, and the net effect remains an empirical question for each
system6.
The above review indicates three things. First, the debate over the effect of pen-
sion wealth on consumption and retirement decisions is far from being resolved. Second,
there is an important need to use improved estimates of pension wealth. Third, the best
modelling framework for testing the underlying hypotheses is unclear.
3. A Model of Consumption and Retirement Behaviour
3.1. The Consumption Function. We propose to investigate the impact of different
components of wealth on consumption using [65][66]Merton’s (1969,1971) representative
agent model.7
The simplest version of the model, based on a HARA utility function and time-
invariant investment opportunities, gives optimal consumption as a linear function of
wealth:
C∗t = a+ bWt (3.1)
where the coefficients a and b are, in turn, functions of the utility function, investment
opportunities and, possibly, time. In the special case of a logarithmic utility function
and a finite horizon a = 0 and b = (T − t)−1, i.e., consumption is spread evenly over
the remaining lifetime, a feature that is consistent with the life cycle hypothesis. If the
horizon is infinite, a = 0 and b = ρ, i.e., consumption is proportional to wealth, with the
constant of proportionality equal to the rate of time preference.
The Merton model has strong implications for how consumption is determined. It
predicts that, apart from the parameters relating to the utility function and investment
opportunities, current consumption depends only on current total wealth, not on the
composition of wealth and not on any other variable8. But this is likely to hold only in a
world of perfect capital and labour markets, where, for example, individuals can borrow
6The psychological research literature also offers insights. [20]Cagan (1965), for instance, identified a
recognition effect in individual behaviour. When someone is obliged to join a pension scheme, they begin
to recognise for the first time the importance of saving for old age and this encourages them to save even
harder. Similarly, [55]Katona (1964) identified a goal-gradient effect in individual behaviour, whereby
effort is heightened the nearer individuals are to their goal.
7It is well-known that the representative agent model provides a valid representation of microeconomic
behaviour only under certain restrictive conditions concerning the distribution of income in the economy,
namely that it is constant over time or at most a function of deterministic, time-dependent variables
([80]Stoker (1986)). However, [14]Blundell, Pashardes and Weber (1993) have shown that, once these
‘aggregation factors’ have been taken into account, a time-series-based representative agent model is not
necessarily outperformed in terms of forecasting ability by microeconomic models involving panel data. A
study by [43]Goodman, Johnson and Webb (1997, chapter 3) indicates that the distribution of income in
the UK was fairly stable over the post-war period (with a gini coefficient of around 0.26) until 1985, after
which inequalities (particularly at the extremes of the distribution) increased before stabilising again
by 1993 (when the gini coefficient was 0.34). When a variable measuring the annual gini coefficients
over the sample period was included in the equations listed in Tables 4.1 - 4.3 below, it was found to
be statistically insignficant, indicating that the changes in the income distribution since 1985 were not
sufficient to invalidate the representative agent model. Nevertheless, some investigators do not like the
representative model in principle. Indeed, the representative agent model is a strange creature: part
young, part middle aged, part old; part male, part female; part employed, part unemployed, part retired,
etc.
8It also predicts that it is the levels rather than the logarithms of these variables that are important.
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against illiquid and non-tradeable assets such as pension wealth or human capital, and
workers never experience involuntary unemployment.
In practice, we must allow for the following possibilities: that individuals do not adjust
their consumption instantaneously to changes in the level of wealth; that the components
of wealth may have differential effects on consumption; that other characteristics of wealth
may influence consumption (e.g. actual (rather than expected) rates of return on the
wealth components); that individuals are liquidity constrained; that these constraints
may change over time as a result of, say, financial deregulation; and that other factors
may influence consumption.
We accounted for these possibilities in the following way:
. Lagged adjustment. The estimated equations included lags to allow long-run ad-
justments to differ from short-run adjustments.
. Including the components of wealth as separate regressors. We decomposed per-
sonal wealth into eight categories: net financial wealth (W F ), housing wealth (WH),
durable wealth (WD), basic state pension
9 wealth (W B), SERPS
10 wealth (W S),
occupational pension11 wealth (W O), personal pension
12 wealth (W P ) and human
capital (W L).
. Including as regressors the real returns on total wealth and its components: rW ,
rF , rH , rD, rB , rS , rO, rP .
13
. Liquidity constraints. The effect of liquidity constraints is to introduce current in-
come into the consumption function: they can account for the observed ‘excess sen-
sitivity’ of consumption with respect to current income that is inconsistent with the
life cycle model ([45]Hall (1978), [39]Flavin (1985), [84]Zeldes (1989), [24]Cushing
(1992)). Take, for example, eqn (3.1) aggregated over all consumers who are not
liquidity-constrained. Liquidity-constrained individuals are restricted to consuming
their current income. If such individuals receive a fraction of total personal dispos-
able income Yt equal to λ, then the aggregate consumption function will take the
form:
C∗t = a+ bWt + λYt. (3.2)
. Financial deregulation. The late 1970s and 1980s was a period of substantial finan-
cial deregulation and increasing competition between financial institutions. These
forces had a major impact on personal consumption behaviour, in particular in-
ducing a large fall in the personal savings ratio as consumers spent some of their
housing equity. The effect of financial deregulation on the relaxation of liquidity
9This is a flat-rate unfunded pension available to both employees and the self-employed from state
pension age (60 for women and 65 for men).
10SERPS stands for the state earnings related pension scheme: employees are automatically members of
this unfunded scheme unless they have ’contracted out’ into an eligible occupational or personal pension
scheme.
11From a funded defined benefit scheme.
12From a funded defined contribution scheme.
13Internal rates of return were used for rB , rS , and rO, while rW is the weighted average of the eight
components of wealth. A constant real discount rate of 3% was used to estimate the value of human capital
(the same discount rate as is used by the Government Actuary’s Department to estimate the value of state
pension wealth), so it is not possible to include rL as a separate regressor; while not entirely satisfactory,
the use of a constant discount rate for human capital is nevertheless fairly common, e.g., [30]Fama and
Schwert (1977), [78]Shiller (1993), and [54]Jagannathan and Wang (1994).
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and capital market constraints has been investigated by a number of authors, e.g.
[63]Manchester and Poterba (1989), [9]Bayoumi and Koujianou (1990), [21]Campbell
and Mankiw (1991), [67]Miles (1992), and [6][7]Bayoumi (1993a,b). Most of these
studies concluded that liquidity constraints had an important impact on consump-
tion in the 1970s but, by the end of the 1980s, this impact had largely vanished,
except in the case of Japan.14 As a proxy for financial deregulation, [6][7]Bayoumi
(1993a,b) used the ratio of total outstanding consumer credit to GDP, transformed
to equal 0 in 1975 and 1 in 1988 (FINDREG) on the grounds that ‘since consumer
credit is used to finance deviations of consumption from income, this ratio is a use-
ful measure of the extent to which consumers are using credit markets to smooth
consumption’ (Bayoumi (1993b, p.1435).15,16
. Life cycle factors. The Merton model as given in (3.1) explains the optimal con-
sumption behaviour of a representative agent with no bequest motive. In this
framework, consumption is independent of the individual’s age. Different inves-
tigators have accounted for life cycle factors in a variety of ways. Some include
the proportions of the population who are respectively young (the youth depen-
dency ratio (YOUTHDR)) and old (the elderly dependency ratio (AGEDR)) (e.g.,
[70]Modigliani (1970), [35]Feldstein (1980) and [68]Miles and Patel (1997)). Others
include life expectancy (LIFEXP) (e.g. [46]Hamermesh (1985)). Some have at-
tempted to discover a bequest motive. [53]Hurd (1987), for example, has tested for
this using cross-section data by examining whether the savings of the elderly who
have children is higher than the savings of the elderly without children. He finds
no evidence for a bequest motive. However, this motive is impossible to test in an
aggregate time-series context.
. Labour market status. Clearly an individual’s labour market status (employed or
unemployed, in work or retired) can affect consumption behaviour. A number of in-
vestigators include the unemployment rate (UN ). [21]Campbell and Mankiw (1991),
for example, test whether the increase in unemployment in the 1980s might have
tended to counteract the positive impact of financial deregulation on consumption.
Alternatively, if there is a trade-off (nonseparability) between consumption and
leisure, then real wages or hours worked should be included in the model, with
rises in these two variables being associated with higher consumption; the unem-
ployment rate can be used as a proxy for changes in hours worked ([4][5]Barro
(1974,1978), [18]Burkhauser and Turner (1982), [8]Bayoumi (1995)). However, not
everyone who is not in work is registered as unemployed. An alternative measure
that can be used is the labour force participation rate (LABPR). Other investiga-
tors have included either the retirement age (e.g. [72]Munnell (1974), [23]Crawford
and Lilien (1981)) or the labour force participation rate of the elderly (AGEPR)17
([35]Feldstein (1980)).
14This conclusion is not clearcut, however. It is not confirmed by Campbell and Mankiw who argued
that ’the evolution of credit markets over the post-war period does not seem to have caused a detectable
decline in λ [in (3.2)]’ (Campbell and Mankiw (1991, p.753)).
15Other measures have been used such as the index of financial deregulation developed by Muellbauer
and Murphy (1993).
16For an analysis of the role of credit markets in providing consumption insurance in the presence of
aggregate uncertainty, see [62]Mace (1991) and [22]Cochrane (1991).
17The weighted average percentage of women above 60 and men above 65 who are still in work.
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. Variables affecting portfolio decisions. Some investigators have included the vari-
ance of current income (YVOL), since uncertainty about income can reduce con-
sumption and increase precautionary savings ([79]Skinner (1988), [19]Caballero (1990),
[47]Hendry (1994)). Following [47]Hendry (1994, eqn (8)), we estimated YVOL as
the absolute value of the residuals from the following regression equation:
∆`nY ∗t = 0.0214
(2.52)
+ 0.4731
(2.74)
∆`nY ∗t−1− 0.3117
(2.15)
∆`nPt
+ 0.1717
(1.10)
∆`nPt−1− 0.2260
(2.13)
`nY Dt−1
R
2
= 0.39, DW = 1.80, serial correlation χ2(1) = 1.99, functional form χ2(1) = 1.74,
normality χ2(2) = 10.58, heteroscedasticity χ2(1) = 1.77, where Y ∗ is real income,
P is the price level and `nY D is the deviation of `nY from a linear deterministic
trend.
Others have included the inflation rate, because ‘nominal rather, than real inter-
est rate payments are considered to be income in the national accounts, hence in
inflationary times consumers are forced to increase saving simply to keep their debt
position stable’ ([7]Bayoumi (1993b, p.1434). [48]Hendry and von Ungern-Sternberg
(1981) and [47]Hendry (1994) use a variable that results from multiplying the value
of liquid assets by the inflation rate (
.
PF ). A high value for
.
PF would be expected
to induce individuals to increase their savings in order to maintain the real value of
their liquid assets.
. Spillover effects from other sectors. Some investigators have included the savings
of the corporate (SC ) and government (SG) sectors since these might be substi-
tutes for personal sector savings (complements for personal sector consumption)
([31]Feldstein (1974, who used corporate retained earnings), [4][5]Barro (1974,1978,
who used the government surplus), [8]Bayoumi (1995), [68]Miles and Patel (1996)).
Another possibility is to include the surplus in occupational pension schemes (SUR-
PLUS ), on the grounds that some of the surplus might be shared with pensioners,
but in any event increases the wealth of the shareholders of companies running
surpluses.
3.2. Retirement Behaviour. While there are still standard retirement ages (typi-
cally between 60 and 65), increasingly there is flexibility over the actual retirement age.
At the same time, it is also the case that retirement is no longer a strict discrete choice
variable: some people are less than fully employed prior to normal retirement age; others
continue to work after this age. In addition, it is possible to induce retirement. So the
retirement decision is a very complex one and is therefore very difficult to model precisely
in an aggregate time series model.
We propose to investigate retirement behaviour by examining the factors influencing
the labour force participation rate of the elderly (AGEPR). AGEPR has been falling
steadily over the sample period just as per capita wealth has been increasing. So an
obvious question is to ask whether this increase in wealth has helped to induce earlier
retirement. Part of the reason for AGEPR falling is the inceasing longevity of the popu-
lation: there are more very old people now than 50 years ago but we would expect very
few of these to still be in work. To account for this we add LIFEXP to the equation.
Some of the other variables that influence consumption might also influence AGEPR and
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we investigate this possibility as well. The model that is estimated below is an eclectic
one and not based on any particular model of optimal retirement behaviour.
4. The Estimated Models18
4.1. The consumption function. The most general form of the consumption func-
tion that we considered was (in real per capita terms):
Ct = α0 + α1Ct−1 +
8∑
i=1
βiWit +
8∑
i=1
β′iWi,t−1 (4.1)
+
8∑
i=1
γirit +
8∑
i=1
γ′iri,t−1 +
M∑
i=1
δiZit +
M∑
i=1
δ′iZi,t−1 + ut
where
Wit = i
th component of wealth at t
rit = real return on i
th component of wealth at t
Zit = i
th (non-wealth) regressor out of M
ut = residual at t.
Eqn (4.1) is an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model containing I(1) variables
(both endogenous and exogenous). As such it is a reparameterisation of an error cor-
rection model (ECM) and estimation methods suitable for difference-stationary variables
in general need to be used. However, in the case of a model comprising either a single
cointegrating vector or a recursive system (with zero correlation between the error terms),
traditional methods of estimation and inference originally developed for trend-stationary
variables can also be used. We show below that particular interesting cases of eqn (4.1)
contain just a single cointegrating vector and that there is a recursive relationship be-
tween consumption and retirement behaviour (current consumption does not appear as a
regressor in the latter equation). If we make the assumption of zero correlation between
the error terms of the equations for consumption and retirement behaviour, then we can
derive consistent estimates of our two-equation system using single equation methods
(see [74]Pesaran and Shin (1997)). A more conventional approach would have been to
use VAR estimation methods, but recent research has shown that any biases using these
methods will be proportional to the dimension of the system which in our case is large
(see [42]Gonzalo and Lee (1998) and [1]Abadir, Hadri and Tzavalis (1999)). Other par-
ticular cases of interest of eqn (4.1) contain two cointegrating vectors. But tests indicate
that, in each case, one of these vectors has parameters that are not significantly different
from those derived using least squares estimation and the other vector has an insignifi-
cant adjustment parameter, so that there is no feedback from this vector. Efficiency can
therefore be improved by dropping the second vector and again using traditional methods
to estimate the ARDL model incorporating just a single cointegrating vector.
We first tested for the validity of the linear version of Merton’s model which says that
consumption is at most a linear function of aggregate wealth. Column (1) of Table 4.1
presents estimates for the case of a logarithmic utility function and an infinite horizon.
In terms of (4.1), the following restrictions are imposed: α0 = α1 = β
′
i = γi = γ
′
i = δi =
18The data are annual for the UK for the period 1948-1994. Most of the wealth data in this paper are
taken from Blake and Orszag (1999). The exception is human capital which is estimated as the expected
present value of lifetime earnings for the whole adult population.
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δ′i = 0 and βi = β, for all i. This specification of the Merton model is rejected: the esti-
mated equation is not well-specified and in particular does not constitute a cointegrating
regression; in fact the trace likelihood ratio test indicates that there are no cointegrating
vectors present. Nevertheless, we derive a point estimate for the rate of time preference
for the UK personal sector of 3.3%. Column (2) presents the estimates for the more
general case of a HARA utility function and an infinite horizon (see eqn. (3.1)), while
column (3) introduces some short-term dynamics for this case. Again neither equation is
well-specified: in particular the residuals are neither stationary nor serially uncorrelated.
We may conclude from this that the Merton model in which current consumption depends
only on current aggregate wealth is rejected by the data.
The remaining columns of Table 4.1 examine the separate effects on consumption of
the eight components of aggregate wealth (i.e., allow the βi to differ). The diagnostic tests
indicate that there are four cointegrating vectors. However the resulting error correction
model (column (4)) is poorly specified and in particular exhibits massive predictive failure
over the period 1986-94, which covered the late 80s boom and the early 90s slump. Of
particular interest is the test for the equality of the coefficients on the cointegrating
vectors (i.e. βi = β, for all i). The hypothesis is decisively rejected for each of the four
cointegrating vectors, only one of which (the last) has a significant adjustment parameter
in the error correction model.
Table 4.2 shows the results from including additional variables as regressors in the
consumption function19. Column (1) adds these extra regressors (including the total re-
turn on wealth) to the equation involving aggregate wealth. The trace likelihood ratio
test indicates the presence of a just a single cointegrating vector, so that OLS provides
super-consistent estimates of the parameters of this equation. The exclusion test indicates
their joint significance and the equation passes all the diagnostic tests, except that for
predictive failure over the period 1986-94. Column (2) adds the extra regressors to the
equation involving the components of wealth, while column (3), in addition, separates the
total return on wealth into its components. The trace likelihood ratio test indicates the
presence of two cointegrating vectors for each of these cases. However, in each case, the
test statistic reported immediately below indicates that the first of these vectors is not
significantly different from that obtained from OLS estimation of the relevant restricted
ARDL equation, while the second vector has a statistically insignificant adjustment pa-
rameter in the corresponding error correction model: the t-statistic is 0.92 in the case of
the second cointegrating vector associated with column (2) and 0.62 in the case of the
second cointegrating vector associated with column (3). Under these circumstances OLS
estimation of the ARDL equations in columns (2) and (3) provide consistent estimates
since the ECM term for the second cointegrating vector that is relegated to the residual
term is by definition orthogonal to the included regressors. These equations also now pass
all the diagnostic tests, including that for predictive failure.
Wealth has a direct net positive effect w53Tj)21.)44A(s9.4?Td)(ECM)T00?Td)(ECM)Tj)26.6024?0?Td)(term)Tj)24.0022?0j)5.2?mates)Tj)-34margialte is f of
sabTj)10.2796?0?Td)(eou)Tj)17.5121?0?Td)(t.014).aOthecolp onents of t ealth, whousng w
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(1965). Wealth also has an indirect effect since it influences retirement behaviour (in our
case measured by labour participation after normal retirement age). We find a negative
relationship between consumption and AGEPR which reinforces the positive direct wealth
effect on consumption, since rising wealth reduces AGEPR (see Table 4.4 below) and so
indirectly increases consumption. The real return on aggregate wealth also has a positive
impact on consumption (the marginal effect is about 0.02), indicating that the wealth
effect of a change in the rate of return dominates the substitution effect. When the re-
turn on aggregate wealth is replaced by its components, only the returns on net financial
wealth and basic state pension wealth are significant, again with positive coefficients.
Turning to the non-wealth variables, we find that current income is highly significant,
with a coefficient varying between 0.4 and 0.7 depending on the specification: the coeffi-
cient measures the proportion of consumers who are liquidity constrained. The significance
of other non-wealth variables is sensitive to the specification of the wealth variables, with
only government savings (SG) being significant in all three equations, and only pension
fund surpluses (apart from AGEPR) being significant in both the equations using dis-
aggregated wealth. Many variables that other investigators have found important turn
out not to be significant when the wealth variable is measured correctly: durable assets,
measures of financial deregulation, the age dependency ratio, life expectancy, the labour
force participation rate, and income volatility. The specifications in Table 4.2 are fairly
parsimonious with respect to non-wealth variables.
The results in the table can be compared with those from a study of national savings
by [29]Edwards (1996) who used a panel of 36 OECD, Latin American and East Asian
countries (but excluding the US and UK). His main conclusions were that private sav-
ings were negatively related to the elderly dependency ratio, government savings (with a
coefficient of about -0.5), and social security spending. Our results for the UK indicate
that the elderly dependency ratio is not a significant determinant of consumption or per-
sonal savings (suggesting that the shares of income consumed and saved do not change as
British people get older, a result that contrasts both with the life cycle model and with
Edwards’ panel data evidence for other countries), that government savings partially dis-
place personal savings (with a coefficient of about -0.2) and that social security wealth
partially displaces personal savings (with a coefficient of either -0.03 or -0.3 depending on
whether we use basic state pension wealth or SERPS wealth). A study by [76]Poterba
et al. (1996) found that raising contribution limits for tax-exempt Individual Retirement
Accounts and 401(k) pension plans in the US between 1983 and 1986 led to a one-for-one
increase in personal savings.20 We find exactly the same result when personal pensions
(the equivalent of IRAs and 401(k) plans) were introduced in the UK in 1988.
The results can also be compared with some cross-section studies for the UK. [2]Alessie,
Devereux and Weber (1997), using a cohort analysis, while accepting that the high statu-
tory downpayments on durables in the UK until June 1982 imposed a binding constraint
on relatively young households, found that the sharp increase in consumer expenditure
between 1985 and 1988 could not be explained by the additional steps towards full fi-
nancial liberalisation that took place between 1984 and 1986. We find a similar result.
[3]Attanasio and Weber (1994) argued that the main cause of the consumer boom between
20However, a study by [41]Gale and Scholz (1994) covering the same period found that the increased
contribution limits on IRAs merely shifted taxable forms of savings into tax-favoured IRAs with little
increase overall in national savings. These two studies therefore suggest that the increase in personal
savings might be substantially offset by the reduction in government savings needed to finance the tax
breaks.
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1985 and 1986 appeared to be upward revisions in expected lifetime labour income by the
younger cohorts of the population who were mainly responsible for the boom; house price
increases were important determinants of consumption after 1982, but could not on their
own explain the consumption surge after 1985. We also find that housing wealth is an
important determinant of consumption, although we could not find a statistically signifi-
cant role for human capital.
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housing wealth and personal pension wealth have the effect of delaying retirement23. The
effect of income on elderly participation is strongly positive with an elasticity varying
between 0.7 and 0.95. In the equation involving aggregate wealth, an increase in youth
dependency has a strong effect in delaying retirement: people have to work longer if they
have more children. Interestingly, state pension wealth appears to have no net effect on
the retirement decision, suggesting that for the UK, the Sheshinski, Boskin and Hurd
effect and the Blinder, Gordon and Wise effect (discussed in Section 2 above) are exactly
offsetting.
23This again appears to be evidence against the life cycle hypothesis.
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Table 4.1 Regressions of consumption on wealth
Dependent variables:
Regressors: C (1) C (2) C (3) ∆C (4) [Cointegrating vectors]
Constant - 1.8009 0.7095 -0.3875 - - - -
(t-ratio) (24.90) (3.50) (0.48)
C∗−1 - - 0.6111 - - - - -
(5.69)
W ∗ 0.03336 0.0233 0.0094 - - - - -
(56.39) (53.76) (3.83)
W ∗F - - - - -0.0529 2.8511 0.0638 0.1343
W ∗H - - - - 0.1433 .8775 .1800 .0392
W ∗D - - - - 0.8941 -8.6846 -0.3784 -0.7726
W ∗∗B - - - -0.0202 - - - -
(0.39)
W ∗S - - - - 3.7376 -9.0452 -0.5751 0.2399
W ∗O - - - - -1.0278 0.0260 0.0623 -0.2222
W ∗P - - - - -1.1865 -2.2796 0.8144 -0.0076
W ∗L - - - - -0.0218 0.3802 -0.0127 0.0240
Trend - - - 0.0069 - - - -
(0.34)
ECM1−1 - - - -0.0118 - - – -
(0.08)
ECM2−1 - - - 0.1620 - - - -
(1.11)
ECM3−1 - - - 0.2347 - - - -
(1.61)
ECM4−1 - - - 0.3612 - - - -
(2.48)
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Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS J J J J
R
2
0.7734 0.9843 0.9907 0.1299
RSS 21.0856 1.4264 0.7979 0.8288
SER 0.6770 0.1780 0.1362 0.1458
F - 2890 2395 2.1
(1,45,4.1) (2,43,3.2) (6,39,2.3)
Maximum log -47.8535 15.4418 27.9796 99.1065
likelihood
DW 0.0312 0.3344 0.8861 1.2583
Durbin h - - 5.5153 -
Serial correlation, 44.3417 31.4816 20.3750 9.7200
χ2(1,3.84)
Functional form 42.0431 6.5047 3.8208 2.0914
misspecification
χ2(1,3.84)
Normality, χ2 8.1301 2.9542 0.4039 2.8470
(2,5.99)
Heteroscedast- 1.1041 1.2392 8.6238 2.8282
icity χ2(1,3.84)
Stationarity of -0.0093 -2.1256 -3.5731 -4.0745
resids., t(-4.0)
No. of cointeg- 0 0 0 4
rating vectors (8.6,23.8) (8.6,23.8) (8.6,23.8) (58.2,58.9)
Predictive fail. 38.9394 14.1143 37.9824 18823.24
χ2(9,16.99)
Equality of - - - - 11.3 11.4 11.7 11.8
parameters of
cointegrating
vec. χ2(4,9.49)
Notes:
1. Sample period: 1948 - 1994.
2. Estimates and diagnostic tests fromMicrofit ([73]Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, sec 6.6-
6.7)); OLS= ordinary least squares; J= Johansen method; t-ratios in parentheses,
unless otherwise indicated; first differences of variables are denoted by ∆.
3. C = consumption; W = total wealth; WF = net financial wealth; WH = housing
wealth; WD = durable wealth; W B = basic state pension wealth; W S = SERPS
wealth; W O = occupational pension wealth; W P = personal pension wealth; W L
= human capital.
4. RSS = residual sum of squares;
SER = standard error of the regression;
F = F-test of the joint significance of the regressors;
Serial correlation = Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation;
Functional form misspecification = Ramsey’s RESET test using squared fitted val-
ues;
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Normality = Jarque-Bera’s test based on the skewness and kurtosis of the residuals;
Heteroscedasticity = test of equality of error variances based on a regression of
squared residuals on squared fitted values;
Stationarity of residuals = augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
5. The brackets besides the F and χ2 tests indicate the degrees of freedom and the
corresponding 5% critical value.
6. ∗indicates I(1) endogenous variable, ∗∗indicates I(0) endogenous variable (about a
trend), ∗∗∗indicates I(1) exogenous variable, ∗∗∗∗indicates I(0) exogenous variable
(about a trend), ECM = error correction term.
7. The test for the number of cointegrating vectors is the trace likelihood ratio test
using a VAR of order 1 with unrestricted intercepts and trends (selected using the
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion); beneath the figure indicating the number of cointe-
grating vectors is the test statistic for an additional cointegrating vector, followed
by the 5% critical value for this test. The cointegrating vectors are normalised on
the dependent variable.
8. The test for the parameters of a cointegrating vector being equal is based on a
likelihood ratio test of over-identifying restrictions on the cointegrating vectors.
Given four cointegrating vectors, there are four just-identifying restrictions and four
over-identifying restrictions for this test; hence there are four degreees of freedom
for the test statistic. The restrictions were imposed on each cointegrating vector in
turn.
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Table 4.2 Regressions of consumption on wealth and
additional variables
Dependent variables:
Regressors: C (1) C (2) [Cointegrating C (3) [Cointegrating
vectors] vectors]
Constant 0.3679 1.2693 - - 0.5163 - -
(t-ratio) (1.55) (10.24) (2.46)
C∗−1 0.1591 - - - 0.1295 - -
(2.17) (2.31)
W ∗ 0.0096 - - - - - -
(5.56)
W ∗H - 0.0417 0.0300 0.0041 0.0436 0.0528 0.0310
(11.18) (9.16)
W ∗∗B - 0.0308 - - 0.0282 - -
(2.54) (2.42)
W ∗S,−1 - 0.2901 0.2931 -1.0998 0.2241 0.3947 -0.1520
(5.58) (4.35)
W ∗O,−1 - -0.0964 -0.0352 0.3455 -0.0934 -0.1095 0.0702
(4.67) (4.59)
∆W ∗∗P - -1.0507 - - -0.8551 - -
(9.47) (6.00)
r∗∗∗∗W 0.0223 0.0241 - - - - -
(2.76) (4.80)
r∗∗∗∗F - - - - 0.0016 - -
(4.25)
r∗∗∗∗B - - - - 0.0507 - -
(4.32)
Y ∗ 0.4053 0.7054 0.7077 0.8432 0.6146 0.6601 0.7814
(7.77) (21.13) (12.49)
YOUTHDR∗∗∗ 0.0128 - - - - - -
(1.22)
∆UN ∗∗∗∗ -0.0533 - - - - - -
(6.68)
AGEPR∗∗∗ - -0.0364 0.0119 -0.1701 -0.0324 0.0193 -0.0495
(4.73) (4.32)
.
P
∗∗∗
F -0.0809 - - - - - -
(2.88)
SG∗∗∗ 0.2778 0.2138 0.3208 -0.2659 0.1876 0.1719 -0.0002
(5.27) (5.63) (4.21)
SC ∗∗∗ - - - - 0.1478 0.0074 -0.1546
(2.56)
SURPLUS ∗∗∗ - 0.0295 -0.0071 0.0725 0.0212 0.0226 0.0350
(2.40) (1.84)
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Estimation method OLS OLS J J OLS J J
R
2
0.9989 0.9995 0.9996
RSS 0.0832 0.0355 0.0254
SER 0.0474 0.0318 0.0282
F 4977 8840 8690
(8,37,2.2) (10,35,2.1) (13,32,2.1)
Maximum log likelihood 79.9644 99.5750 107.28
DW 1.8005 2.0409 2.1105
Durbin h 0.7796 - -0.4051
Serial correlation, 0.5355 0.0371 0.1707
χ2(1,3.84)
Functional form 2.0295 0.0260 0.6752
misspecification,
χ2(1,3.84))
Normality, χ2(2,5.99) 3.0694 1.5104 0.8937
Heteroscedasticity, 2.9699 0.0999 0.0126
χ2(1,3.84))
Stationarity of residuals, -5.9968 -6.8590 -7.0110
t(-4.0 approx.)
No. of cointegrating 1 2 2
vectors (20.8,38.5) (51.7,60.5) (67.1,67.2)
Equality of cointegrating - 15.37, 48.44 26.01,37.25
vector with OLS values (12,23.3) (14,26.1)
Predictive failure, 53.2932 12.4612 14.6081
χ2(9,16.90)
Exclusion of non-wealth 41.2 44.5 44.2
variables, χ2 (6,12.6) (5,11.1) (7,14.1)
Notes:
1. See notes to Table 4.1.
2. C = consumption; W = total wealth; W H = housing wealth; W B = basic state
pension wealth; W S = SERPS wealth; W O = occupational pension wealth; W P =
personal pension wealth; rW = return on total wealth; rF = return on net financial
wealth; rB = return on basic state pension wealth; Y = personal disposable income;
Y OUTHDR = youth dependency ratio; UN = unemployment rate; AGEPR =
age dependency ratio;
.
PF= inflation loss on liquid assets; SC = company savings;
GS = government savings; SURPLUS = actuarial surplus in occupational pension
schemes.
3. The test for the equality between the coefficients of a cointegrating vector estimated
using Johansen methods and those estimated by OLS is based on a likelihood ratio
test of over-identifying restrictions on each cointegrating vector. Given two cointe-
grating vectors, there are two just-identifying restrictions and six over-identifying
restrictions for each vector in column (2) (seven overidentifying restrictions in col-
umn (3)); hence there are twelve (fourteen) degreees of freedom for the test statistic.
The OLS values were imposed on each cointegrating vector in turn, while the param-
eters of the other vector were fixed at their unrestricted values. The test statistics
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are listed in the same order as the cointegrating vectors in the adjacent columns.
Beneath the test statistics are the degrees of freedom and the 2.5% critical value.
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Table 4.3 Long-run elasticities of consumption with
respect to wealth and additional variables
Dependent variable:
Regressors: C (1) C (2) C (3)
W 0.3447 - -
(t-ratio) (8.18)
WH - 0.0712 0.0811
(11.18) (7.76)
W B - 0.0441 0.0444
(2.54) (2.47)
W S - 0.1066 0.0977
(5.58) (5.10)
W O - -0.0883 -0.0860
(4.67) (4.10)
∆W P - -0.0072 -0.0066
(9.47) (6.46)
rW 0.0054 0.0044 -
(1.04) (4.80)
rF - - 0.0003
(3.91)
rB - - 0.0063
(2.33)
Y 0.5030 0.7727 0.7693
(9.78) (21.13) (20.58)
YOUTHDR 0.0528 - -
(1.19)
∆UN -0.0015 - -
(5.11)
AGEPR∗ - -0.0819 -0.0702
(4.73) (3.64)
.
PF -0.0068 - -
(2.21)
SG 0.0035 0.0021 0.0023
(8.32) (5.63) (5.41)
SC - - 0.0180
(2.02)
SURPLUS - 0.0018 0.0013
(2.40) (1.68)
Notes:
1. See notes to Table 4.1 and note 2 of Table 4.2.
2. The elasticities are evaluated at the sample means.
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Table 4.4 Regression of the age participation rate
on wealth and other variables
Dependent variable:
Regressors: AGEPR(1) AGEPR(2)
Constant 122.2589 5.8181
(t-ratio) (5.38) (3.78)
AGEPR∗∗∗−1 0.5614 0.5541
(5.21) (5.23)
W ∗ -0.0346 -
(2.64)
W ∗H - 0.1881
(4.87)
W ∗O - -0.5350
(3.77)
W ∗P - 2.3037
(4.94)
W ∗L - -0.0586
(4.92)
Y ∗ 1.9581 1.2056
(3.63) (4.35)
YOUTHDR∗∗∗ 0.4598 -
(2.97)
LIFEXP∗∗∗∗ -1.6722 -
(5.47)
Estimation method OLS OLS
R
2
0.9824 0.9855
RSS 6.8758 5.5158
SER 0.4146 0.3761
Mean 12.3213 12.3213
SD 3.1226 3.1226
F 503 511
(5,40,2.5) (6,39,2.3)
Maximum log likelihood -21.5567 -16.4874
DW 1.9476 2.1090
Durbin h 0.2602 -0.5317
Serial correlation, 0.0074 0.2615
χ2(1,3.84)
Functional form 0.3085 7.9855
misspecification, χ2(1,3.84)
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Normality, χ2(2,5.99) 0.6170 0.6866
Heteroscedasticity, 1.0389 3.6756
χ2(1,3.84)
Stationarity of -6.6313 -7.0162
residuals, t(-5.0 approx.)
No. of cointegrating 1 1
vectors (29.4,39.3) (67.2,82.2)
Predictive failure,
χ2(9,16.90) 6.2297 11.9268
Note:
1. See notes to Table 4.1.
2. AGEPR = age dependency ratio; W = total wealth;W H = housing wealth;W O =
occupational pension wealth;W P = personal pension wealth;W L = human capital;
Y = personal disposable income; Y OUTHDR = youth dependency ratio; LIFEXP
= life expectancy.
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Table 4.5 Long-run elasticities of the age participation
rate on wealth and other variables
Dependent variable:
Regressors: AGEPR(1) AGEPR(2)
W -0.4413 -
(1.53)
WH - 0.1534
(3.89)
W O - -0.4839
(14.50)
W P - 0.0682
(10.17)
W L - -0.5148
(3.09)
Y 0.9520 0.7058
(2.17) (4.11)
YOUTHDR 2.0485 -
(10.81)
LIFEXP -10.8196 -
(5.94)
Notes:
1. See notes to Table 4.1 and note 2 of Table 4.4.
2. The elasticities are evaluated at the sample means.
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5. Conclusion
Economic theory suggests that the most suitable functional form for consumption is as
a linear function of wealth. Capital and labour market imperfections may mean that
the components of wealth have differential effects and that other variables such as those
relating to income, labour market or demographic status and spillovers from other sectors
also have important influences. Further, wealth can influence the retirement decision
which, in turn, can affect consumption.
We find that all these factors are important in our analysis of consumption and retire-
ment behaviour in the UK. In particular, we find that, when wealth is measured correctly
to include pension wealth, housing wealth and human capital, we can derive relatively
parsimonious models explaining both aggregate consumption and labour market partic-
ipation by the elderly. These models forecast well between 1986 and 1994, a period for
which conventional (mainly logarithmic) consumption functions have forecasted badly.
In terms of state pension wealth, we find similar results to those found by [31] [32] [34]
[36] Feldstein (1974,1976,1979,1982), namely that state pensions have a strong savings
replacement effect and reduce the need to save privately for retirement. However, they
have no induced retirement effect (or at least an effect in reducing the elderly participation
rate). Private occupational pensions, in contrast, have a direct effect in increasing savings
(reducing consumption), but an indirect effect in lowering savings via their effect on
lowering the elderly participation rate (which helps to raise consumption). The net effect
on savings is positive, however. Private personal pensions also have a direct effect in
increasing savings, and this is reinforced by the positive effect that personal pensions have
in raising the elderly participation rate.24 In addition, we found that occupational pension
fund surpluses had an effect in raising consumption (as a result of contribution holidays).
So one possible explanation for conventional UK consumption functions underpredicting
the consumer boom in the late 1980s is that they ignore pension wealth, especially state
pension (SERPS) wealth and the occupational pension fund surpluses that arose from the
stock market boom of the 1980s.
We draw three conclusions from this study. First, our results differ markedly from
those found from other UK time series studies that have tested the impact of pension
wealth on consumption: we put the fact that these studies found no significant effect
down to their poor measures of pension wealth. Second, the results from this time series
study are broadly consistent with those from cross-section studies: for example, both
types of study indicate that social security and housing wealth reduce personal savings,
that private pension wealth increases personal savings, that occupational pensions help
to induce retirement, and that personal pensions tend to delay retirement. Third, our
results do not appear to be consistent with the life cycle hypothesis: for example, we do
not find that the share of income saved falls as people get older.
Certain important policy implications also emerge from this study. First, if govern-
ments wish to increase national savings or delay retirement, they should consider establish-
ing individual retirement accounts for state pension schemes. This has been recommended
by, inter alia, [33][37]Feldstein (1978, 1997).25 Second, as capital market imperfections are
24From Tables 4.4 and 4.8, the long-run elasticities of savings with respect to occupational and personal
pension wealth, taking into account their long-run impact on the elderly participation rate, are 0.0577
and 0.0127 respectively.
25National savings increased sharply in Chile following the privatisation of pension provision in 1981
([43]Holzman (1997)), although, as [41]Gale and Scholz (1994) have shown, any tax breaks used to
encourage private pensions will tend to reduce public savings. [38]Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) have
also shown that policies that raise domestic savings also succeed in raising the domestic capital stock: at
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increasingly eliminated, consumers will find that they can borrow against their ‘illiquid’
pension assets in the same way that they found they could borrow against their ‘illiq-
uid’ housing assets from the beginning of the 1980s. This will have a striking impact on
consumption and make it much more difficult for the authorities to influence consump-
tion using conventional policy tools. It could even offset the positive savings effect from
private, funded pension schemes.
6. Data Appendix
Some of the data used in this study were taken from publicly available sources; other data
needed to be constructed. Table 6.1 lists definitions and sources. All the level variables
are measured in real per capita terms, while the rates of return are in real terms. The
data are annual.
The wealth variables and the rates of return on these needed to be constructed. We
used eight categories of personal wealth: net financial wealth, housing wealth, consumer
durable assets, basic state pension wealth, state earnings related pension scheme (SERPS)
wealth, occupational pension wealth, personal pension wealth, and human capital. The
construction of the first seven categories was undertaken in [11]Blake and Orszag (1999)
and the data for these variables are taken directly from this source. Human capital is
estimated as the expected present value of lifetime earnings (that is, earnings both in
work and retirement) for the whole adult population (assuming a constant real discount
rate of 3%, the same as that used by the Government Actuary’s Department in preparing
estimates of state and occupational pension benefits in the UK).
The definitions of the rates of return are also given in Table 6.1. The expected rate
of return from membership of a defined benefit pension scheme has to take into account
the fact that while current pension contributions buy current accrued pension rights, the
actual pension benefit does not take place until retirement. The means that accrued
benefits have to be revalued and survived to retirement age, dynamised from retirement
age until death and then discounted back to the date of accrual in order to find the internal
rate of return on the scheme.
Contributions (Kt) into a defined benefit scheme are usually proportional to current
income and in the case of occupational schemes attract tax relief:
Kt = γt(1− τ1)Yt (6.1)
where
γt = member’s contribution rate
Yt = member’s current income
τ1 = marginal tax rate in work.
These contributions buy an accrued benefit (Bt) which is generally related to salary
at retirement and is taxable. Define:
Bt = βt(1− τ2)Yt
(
(1 + gp)(1 + gY )
1 + k
)M  L∑
s=0
(
1 + gp
1 + k
)s
+ λ
L′∑
s=0
(
1 + gp
1 + k
)s+L+1
most one-third of any increment leaks abroad.
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=
βt(1− τ2)(1 + gY )
M
[
(1− vL)(1 + r)L + λ(1− vL
′
)
]
δ(1 + r)M+L
Yt (6.2)
where
βt = annual pension accrual rate (e.g. 1/60
th)
τ2 = marginal tax rate in retirement
gp = forecast inflation rate (we assume this equals the actual inflation rate in year t;
similar results were obtained using a five-year moving average of inflation)
gY = assumed growth rate in labour productivity (= 1.5%)
M = number of years to normal retirement
L = expected pension length of member
L′ = additional expected pension length of surviving spouse
λ = pension fraction of surviving spouse (e.g. 0.5)
r = 1+k1+gp − 1 = real interest rate
v = 11+r
δ = `n(1 + r) = force of (real) interest.
The expected nominal return from scheme membership is the discount rate k that
equates the present values of benefits in (6.2) and current contributions in (6.1) (i.e. the
internal rate of return).
We can calculate the internal rates of return on the three defined benefit schemes for
the average scheme member who in the case of the state scheme is 41 years old with 21
years to retirement (M = 21) and in the case of an occupational scheme is 43 years old
with 19 years to retirement (M = 19). We note that the rate of return will not depend
on the member’s current income, Yt. It will also not depend on the tax rate so long as
contributions are tax relieved and the pension is taxed at the same rate as contributions
are relieved (i.e. τ1 = τ2): a pension scheme gives a tax subsidy during the contribution
phase but (with the exception of the tax-free lump sum) takes it back during the benefit
phase. However, the state pension schemes do not give tax relief on contributions, yet
the pension is taxable, so there might be a tax effect with these schemes. Also if the
marginal tax rate is lower in retirement than in work, this will generate a tax effect,
since the pension scheme then permits tax avoidance rather than simply tax deferral.
The rate of return will depend positively on the accrual rate, the growth rate in labour
productivity, the assumed inflation rate and on longevity; it will be negatively related to
the contribution rate.
The pension length differs according to the type of scheme: occupational pension
scheme members tend to experience lighter mortality than the population as a whole and
so will tend to draw their pensions for longer. The estimated pension lengths in the state
schemes were based on commonly-used mortality tables covering the whole population,
namely English Life Tables No.11 (1950-52), No.12 (1960-62), No.13 (1970-72), and No.14
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(1980-82), with interpolation for intervening years. We took the case of a ‘hybrid’ 41-year-
old male with a 36-year-old spouse. For example in 1981, such a man could expect to
live until he was 73 years and his wife could expect to live until she was 79. If this man
retired at 62 (i.e. half way between the state retirement age for men and women), his
pension length would be 11 years and the surviving spouse’s pension length would be 6
years. In contrast, with occupational schemes, the estimated pension lengths were based
on the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries’ tables a(55) and a(90) for annuitants, again
with interpolation for intervening years; the expected life time of an annuitant equals the
value of a life-time annuity of one unit when the interest rate is zero. These tables indicate
that occupational pension scheme members and their spouses live about five years longer
than for the population as a whole.
In the case of the basic state pension scheme, the contribution rate (γt) is 2% of the
LEL. There is no tax relief on contributions into the BSP scheme and although the BSP
is taxable, its annual value is below the single individual’s personal allowance, so we can
ignore tax effects here. In terms of eqn. (6.1), Yt = LELt and τ1 = 0. The average
annual accrual rate (βt) is 2.42% (i.e. the average of the male and female accrual rates
of 1/44th and 1/39th respectively).
In the case of SERPS, there is no tax relief on contributions made by the employee,
but the SERPS pension is taxable and the average person is likely to pay tax on it once
the BSP has been taken into account. The annual pension accrual rate has been falling
over time:
1978 - 87 1.25%
1988 1.225
1989 1.205
1990 1.188
1991 1.173
1992 1.161
1993 1.150
1994 1.141
The GAD surveys of occupational pension schemes found the following gross average
member’s contribution rates into such schemes has been rising over time:
1956 3.34%
1963 3.50
1967 3.60
1971 3.70
1973 4.08
1975 4.29
1983 4.64
1987 4.72
1991 4.67
We used interpolation for the intervening years. The average annual accrual rate is
1.67% (i.e. 1/60th). Most people commute part of their pension into a tax-free lump sum
of 1.50 times their final salary and receive a reduced pension based on the 80ths scale (i.e.
1.25%) but this equates to an accrual rate of approximately 1.67%.
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Personal pension schemes are defined contribution schemes and the value of the pen-
sion depends exclusively on the size of the contributions and the subsequent investment
performance. The minimum net contribution rate into an appropriate personal pension
scheme is equal to the contracted out rebate as follows:
1987 2.5%
1988 - 92 2.0
1993 + 1.8
The GAD’s 1991 survey of occupational pension schemes (Table 6.5) showed that
the average member’s contribution into a money purchase scheme was higher than the
minimum at 4.95%. The rate of return on personal pension scheme assets is defined by:
kPt =
Kt(1− c
m
t ) +WPt(1− c
f )
Kt(1− τ1) +WPt
(1 + kt)− 1 (6.3)
where
Kt = contribution amount into personal pension scheme
WPt = value of accrued personal pension assets
cmt = rate of management charges on contributions
cf = rate of fund management charges (we assume 1 per cent)
kt = total (nominal) rate of return on financial assets.
The data for eqn. (6.3) are taken from Table 12 of [11]Blake and Orszag (1999).
The rates of return used in the analysis are listed in Table 6.2. Table 6.3 shows the
means and standard deviations of the variables used in the analysis. It also shows that
most of the variables contain unit roots. However, LIFEXP, YVOL and most of the rates
of returns are stationary.
Figs. 6.1-6.6 show graphs of some of the data used in the analysis. Fig. 6.1 shows the
well-known strong positive relationship between consumption expenditure and personal
disposable income over the period 1948 to 1994. Fig. 6.2 shows that net financial wealth
was fairly static during the 1950s and 60s, but fell sharply as a result of the high inflation
of the 1970s and then rose sharply as a result of the stock market boom of the 1980s
and 90s. Housing wealth has risen sharply over the period, but has been subject to three
significant booms and slumps since 1970. Figs. 6.3 and 6.4 show how state and private
pension wealth have grown steadily over the period. Fig. 6.5 shows how significantly the
weighting of human capital (W L) is in aggregate wealth. Finally Fig. 6.6 shows that the
elderly participation rate has been falling over most of the period, but appears to have
stabilised in the 1980s.
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Table 6.1 Data definitions and sources
Symbol Name Definition Source
Y Personal disposable Total personal income before tax Economic
income1,2 [gross income of employees Trends
(including employers’ National Annual
Insurance contributions and Supplement
employers’ contributions to
private sector pension schemes)
plus the gross income of the self-
employed plus gross rental income
plus net investment income (total
interest receipts minus total
interest paid)] minus tax payments
on income, employee and employer
National Insurance contributions,
council tax, and other current
transfers (£’000 (1990) per capita)
C Consumers Total consumers expenditure on Economic
expenditure1,2 goods and services (£’000 (1990) Trends
per capita) Annual
Supplement
W Wealth1 Total personal wealth (£’000 Blake and
(1990) per capita) Orszag (1999)
W F Net financial Gross personal financial assets Blake and
wealth1 minus gross personal financial Orszag (1999)
liabilities (£’000 (1990) per capita)
WH Housing wealth
1 Value of housing stock (£’000 Blake and
(1990) per capita) Orszag (1999)
WD Durable assets
1 Value of personal holdings of Blake and
durable assets (£’000 (1990) Orszag (1999)
per capita)
W B Basic state pension Value of accrued rights in the basic Blake and
wealth1 state pension scheme (£’000 Orszag (1999)
(1990) per capita)
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W S SERPS pension Value of accrued rights in the Blake and
wealth1 State Earnings Related Pension Orszag (1999)
Scheme (£’000 (1990) per capita)
W O Occupational Value of accrued rights in Blake and
pension wealth1 occupational pension schemes Orszag (1999)
(£’000 (1990) per capita)
W P Personal pension Value of assets in personal pension Blake and
wealth1 schemes (£’000 (1990) per capita) Orszag (1999)
W L Human capital
1 Expected present value of lifetime
earnings (£’000 (1990) per capita)
rF Return on net Weighted rate of return on gross
financial wealth3 personal financial assets minus
weighted rate of interest on gross
personal financial liabilities (% real)
rH Return on Capital gains plus rental yield
housing wealth3 (=consol yield) minus depreciation
on housing wealth (=1%) (% real)
rD Return on Minus depreciation on durable
durable assets3 assets (=10%) (% real)
rB Return on basic Internal rate of return on members’ Eqns (6.1)
state pension contributions into the basic state and (6.2)
wealth3 pension scheme (% real)
rS Return on Internal rate of return on members’ Eqns (6.1)
SERPS wealth3 contributions into SERPS (% real) and (6.2)
rO Return on Internal rate of return on members’ Eqns. (6.1)
occupational contributions into occupational and (6.2)
pension wealth3 pension schemes (% real)
rP Return on Return on assets in personal pension Eqn. (6.3)
personal schemes (% real)
pension wealth3
rW Return on total Weighted-average return on
wealth eight categories of wealth
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YVOL Income Absolute value of residuals from Hendry (1994,
volatility regression equation for Y (%) Eqn. (8))
.
PF Inflation loss on Product of retail price inflation
liquid assets rate and WF (£’000 (1990) per
capita)
FINDREG Index of financial Ratio of outstanding consumer Annual
deregulation credit to GDP between 1975 Abstract of
and 1988 transformed to equal Statistics
0 in 1975 and 1 in 1988; 0 for
other years
YOUTHDR Youth depend- Population aged below 15 as Government
ency ratio a percentage of the total Actuary’s
population (%) Department
AGEDR Age dependency Population aged above 60 as Government
ratio a percentage of the total Actuary’s
population (%) Department
LIFEXP Life Average age at death (years) English life
expectancy Tables,
Office of
Population,
Censuses and
UN Unemployment Total unemployment as a Economic Trends
rate percentage of the total Annual
workforce4 (%) Supplement
LABPR Labour force Workforce in employment5 as Economic Trends
participation a percentage of the population Annual
rate aged between 15 and 60 (%) Supplement
AGEPR Elderly Economically active males British Labour
participation (≥ 65) plus females (≥ 60) as Statistics Historical
rate a percentage of the population Abstract 1886-
of males (≥ 65) plus females 1968 (Table 109),
(≥ 60) (%) General Household
Survey 1993
(Table 5.3), Labour
Market Trends,
Office for
National Statistics
(Table 7.3, July
1997) Surveys
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SC Company Financial surplus of companies Annual Abstract
savings1 plus gross domestic fixed of Statistics
capital formation minus (net)
capital transfers (£’000
(1990) per capita)
SG Government Financial surplus of government Economic Trends
savings1 plus gross domestic fixed Annual Supplement,
capital formation minus (net) British Economy
capital transfers (£’000 Key Statistics
(1990) per capita) 1900-1970
SURPLUS Actuarial Market value of pension assets
surplus in minus value of accrued
occupational rights in occupational pension
pension schemes (£’000 (1990) per
schemes1 capita)
Notes:
1. This variable is measured in real per capita terms. The nominal variable (in £bn,
current prices) is divided by P × POP , where P is the index of retail prices (1990
= 1) and POP is the population aged 15 or above (in millions)).
2. Personal savings is defined as: personal disposable income minus consumers expen-
diture on goods and services. This implies that contributions to the state pension
schemes, because they are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, are not part of aggre-
gate personal savings (they are treated as transfers from current workers to current
pensioners), but contributions to private funded pension schemes are part of aggre-
gate personal savings.
3. This variable is a real rate of interest expressed in the form `n((1 + k)/(1 + gp))
where k is the nominal return and gp is the inflation rate (`n(P/P−1)).
4. The total workforce is defined as the sum of the workforce in employment and the
unemployed.
5. The workforce in employment is defined as the sum of employees in employment,
the self-employed, those in work-related government training programmes and those
serving in HM Armed Forces.
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Table 6.2 Rates of return on seven categories of personal wealth 1948-94
(Nominal, percent per annum)
Year rF rH rD rB rS rO rP
1948 -0.6 14.8 -12.9 15.3 - 13.7 -
1949 -2.7 -1.8 -14.2 15.0 - 13.6 -
1950 4.9 5.6 -12.7 15.2 - 14.0 -
1951 1.8 9.1 -27.1 20.6 - 18.4 -
1952 -0.6 -1.1 -12.3 20.6 - 16.5 -
1953 10.6 -4.6 -7.8 15.1 - 15.1 -
1954 19.8 -1.6 -10.0 14.2 - 15.5 -
1955 3.0 6.2 -11.1 16.6 - 17.7 -
1956 -4.0 6.4 -14.4 16.7 - 16.5 23.4
1957 -1.2 2.9 -11.1 15.9 - 13.9 14.6
1958 21.9 2.9 -10.0 15.0 - 12.9 37.6
1959 23.8 6.5 -9.0 13.1 - 13.7 25.3
1960 -0.0 10.2 -11.1 13.5 - 15.3 5.8
1961 -0.2 13.9 -12.1 15.6 - 14.9 4.4
1962 3.3 12.4 -12.1 16.4 - 12.9 22.8
1963 9.5 11.4 -11.0 14.2 - 13.3 15.5
1964 -3.7 16.4 -12.0 15.5 - 16.1 4.4
1965 6.2 12.6 -12.0 16.9 - 15.4 13.4
1966 -3.1 8.0 -12.9 16.1 - 15.1 7.8
1967 19.4 11.7 -11.7 14.6 - 12.4 21.2
1968 22.2 11.8 -13.9 16.9 - 16.4 19.5
1969 -7.4 17.0 -14.5 17.4 - 16.1 2.1
1970 -1.5 11.4 -16.5 18.3 - 19.5 8.2
1971 27.6 20.6 -17.5 21.1 - 18.9 34.4
1972 12.9 41.1 -13.8 19.0 - 20.1 15.4
1973 -20.2 46.1 -15.8 20.7 - 20.2 -6.5
1974 -28.0 20.7 -24.9 27.0 - 23.8 -22.8
1975 83.5 17.5 -31.6 34.6 - 31.4 63.3
1976 -0.5 18.6 -19.9 27.5 - 22.0 9.5
1977 36.4 18.2 -25.7 26.9 - 16.4 46.1
1978 5.3 34.3 -19.2 20.0 18.1 19.5 13.4
1979 5.9 39.3 -20.9 24.6 20.5 21.6 13.4
1980 22.1 20.7 -22.1 28.8 25.1 26.0 26.1
1981 6.4 13.1 -14.8 23.3 18.3 19.2 11.8
1982 22.6 15.8 -12.8 20.4 15.6 16.4 33.0
1983 18.7 23.1 -12.7 16.8 15.4 15.6 20.8
1984 19.7 24.9 -12.5 17.2 13.4 13.6 19.4
1985 14.9 20.2 -12.8 18.1 15.4 15.6 17.9
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1986 18.4 23.0 -11.1 15.8 15.0 15.1 21.0
1987 4.7 27.5 -12.1 14.8 15.0 15.0 14.8
1988 5.8 41.5 -16.2 17.1 16.1 15.7 15.0
1989 25.5 14.3 -22.5 19.6 16.5 16.1 24.9
1990 -11.8 5.8 -24.0 21.1 16.8 16.5 -1.9
1991 10.2 6.3 -12.3 17.9 15.4 15.2 15.3
1992 16.1 0.2 -11.4 16.1 13.8 13.7 17.5
1993 23.6 6.4 -7.9 14.2 11.9 11.6 24.6
1994 -8.4 7.9 -12.3 14.9 11.4 11.2 -4.1
Note:
For definitions of variables, see Table 6.1.
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Table 6.3 Summary Statistics 1949-94
Variable Units Mean Standard Dickey Fuller
deviation test1
C £’000 (1990) 5.4687 1.4116 -1.8565
per capita
W £’000 (1990) 157.3242 60.3185 -1.2538
per capita
W F £’000 (1990) 9.2703 1.7325 -0.4166
per capita
WH £’000 (1990) 9.3330 5.9254 -2.1535
per capita
WD £’000 (1990) 3.1392 0.5285 -3.1187
per capita
W B £’000 (1990) 7.8239 3.2551 -4.4984
*
per capita
W 2S £’000 (1990) 2.0103 1.1160 -3.4015
per capita
W O £’000 (1990) 5.0093 4.3860 -0.6882
per capita
SURPLUS £’000 (1990) 0.3287 1.1571 -1.9433
per capita
W 3P £’000 (1990) 0.2118 0.3750 2.5998
per capita
∆W 4P £’000 (1990) 0.0377 0.0818 -4.3385
*
per capita
W L £’000 (1990) 120.5421 45.6424 -1.5239
per capita
rW % (real) 3.0760 1.2630 -4.7939
*
rF % (real) 1.6139 14.7438 -7.3946
*
rH % (real) 6.0400 9.4618 -3.7222
*
rD % (real) -22.5014 10.7200 -2.9182
rB % (real) 10.6401 0.8453 -3.5088
*
r2S % (real) 8.2742 1.8795 -2.4077
rO % (real) 9.0967 2.3376 -4.2358
*
r3p % (real) 8.0440 12.9103 -6.2714
*
Y £’000 (1990) 5.9902 1.6410 -2.3253
per capita
YVOL % 1.4986 1.2818 -5.8358∗
.
PF £’000 (1990) 0.5492 0.3318 -2.7730
per capita
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∆UN % 0.1696 0.9770 -3.6043*
LABPR % 78.9414 1.8455 -1.8642
AGEPR % 12.3213 3.1226 -1.3537
YOUTHDR % 21.8872 1.7647 -1.8947
LIFEXP Years 79.7223 1.0707 -3.6444*
SG £’000 (1990) 0.0536 0.2492 -1.5070
per capita
SC £’000 (1990) 0.7569 0.2515 -2.9864
per capita
Notes:
1 Dickey Fuller test with trend; critical value -3.5088; asterisk indicates variable is
stationary about trend, all other variables are nonstationary.
2 From 1979
3 From 1956
4 From 1957.
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Figure 4.1: Actual and dynamic forecast of consumption (C(1) in Table 4.2), 1985-1994
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Figure 4.2: Actual and static forecast of consumption (C(2) in Table 4.2), 1985-1994
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Figure 4.3: Actual and dynamic forecast of consumption (C(3) in Table 4.2), 1985-1994
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Figure 4.4: Actual and dynamic forecast of the elderly participation rate
(AGEPR(1) in Table 4.4), 1985-1994
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Figure 6.2: Net financial wealth and housing wealth, 1948-1994
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Figure 6.3: Basic state pension wealth and SERPS pension wealth, 1948-1994
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Figure 6.4: Occupational pension wealth and personal pension wealth, 1948-1994
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Figure 6.5: Human capital and total wealth, 1948-1994
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Figure 6.6: Elderly participation rate in the labour force, 1948-1994
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